Matthew Keys Sentencing – 9. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) compared and contrasted with thew British Computer Misuse act of 1990 (CMA)

Jay Leiderman
By: Jay Leiderman
June 12 2016

This Post Continues A Series That Will Comprise The Entirety Of The Matthew Keys Sentencing Documents Filed By The Defense – Part 9

THE COMPUTER MISUSE ACT (CMA) FROM THE UK COMPARED TO AND CONTRASTED WITH THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT (CFAA) FROM THE US – APPENDIX 2 IN THE MATTHEW KEYS CASE

Computer Misuse Act 1990 / 18 U.S Code 1030

18 U.S Code § 1030 Computer Misuse act 1990 (CMA)

Description:

Section:Section:
(a)(1)3 1(1)Whoever knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or exceeding authorized access
(a)(2)

(a)

(b)

(c)

1 (2)

(a)

(b)

(c)

a) 18 U.S.C 1030: Intentionally obtains information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer // CMA: the intent a person has to have to commit an offense under this section need not be directed at (a) any particular program or data, (b) a program or data of any kind, (c) or a program or data held in any particular computer

b) 18 U.S.C 1030: Information from any department or agency of the United States

c) 18 U.S.C 1030: Information from any protected computer

A(5)

(a

(b)

(c)

3ZA (1)(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(a) 18 U.S.C 1030: knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization to a protected computer // CMA: A person does any unauthorized act in relation to a computer

(b) 18 U.S.C 1030: Intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result recklessly causes damage; or // CMA: At the time of doing the act, the person knows it is unauthorized

1.

(c) 18 U.S.C 1030: Intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization and as a result causes damage and loss // CMA: the act causes or creates a significant risk of, serious damage of a material and

2.

(d) CMA: The person intends by doing the act to cause serious damage of a material kind or is reckless as to whether such damage is caused.

(a)(3)

(7)

(a)

(b)

3(2)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a) 18 U.S.C 1030: Threat to cause damage to a protected computer // CMA: to impair the operation of any computer

3.

(b) 18 U.S.C 1030: Threat to obtain information from a protected computer without authorization or in excess of authorization or to impair the confidentiality of information obtained from a protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized service // CMA: to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer

(c) CMA: To impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data

(c)(4)

(a)

(5)

3ZA (2)

(d)

(d) Damage to the national security of any country

(a)(5) Damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security

(c)(4)

(e)

3ZA(3)

(b)

(b) An act causes damages to human welfare if it causes human illness or injury

(e)If the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury

(c)(4)
(f)
3ZA(3)

(a)

(a) Loss to human life

(f) If the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes death

(c)(4)

(ii)

3ZA (3)

(f)

(f) Disruption of services related to health

(ii) The modification or impairment or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals

2 thoughts on “Matthew Keys Sentencing – 9. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) compared and contrasted with thew British Computer Misuse act of 1990 (CMA)

  1. Who there? Jay-san. beep-beep. So zo, whodere, Jason-san? Of ague (fever), agon (literary controversy)Just inside the van door of the den of iniquity, you know, the way I run it, is be Houston half-halt.

    I read your output ladle. You’re puttin’ priceless Oltec, like, little favor the Constitution does if the limit called for absurd security which is better for postal Yosemite.

    Who put the war of the fed.

    How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico’s murderous drug gangs

    Here is a worldwide drug traffic mouse:

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs

    You want to coat with the presence of Audrey, who ran around the shipping office mislabeling.

    Once again, Brodie, the docs are wonderful to read. I like anything with a brig-it. Shazam!

  2. Shemp stepped in, started jostlin’.

    In June 2005, the DEA, the criminal division of the Internal Revenue Service and the US attorney’s office in southern Florida began investigating wire transfers from Mexico to the US. They were traced back to correspondent bank accounts held by casas de cambio at Wachovia. The CDC accounts were supervised and managed by a business unit of Wachovia in the bank’s Miami offices.
    Out of the house, business on how they were lookin’ was a straight crime.
    As early as July 2005, Wachovia was aware that other large US banks were exiting the CDC business based on [anti-money laundering] concerns … despite these warnings, Wachovia remained in business.”

    On 16 March 2010, Douglas Edwards, senior vice-president of Wachovia Bank, (Tipper metal)put his signature to page 10 of a 25-page settlement, in which the bank admitted its role as outlined by the prosecutors. On page 11, he signed again, as senior vice-president of Wells Fargo. The documents show Wachovia providing three services to 22 CDCs in Mexico: wire transfers, a “bulk cash service” and a “pouch deposit service”, to accept “deposit items drawn on US banks, eg cheques and traveller’s cheques”, as spotted by Woods.

    “For the time period of 1 May 2004 through 31 May 2007, Wachovia processed at least $373.6bn in CDCs, $4.7bn in bulk cash” – a total of more than $378.3bn, a sum that dwarfs the budgets debated by US state and UK local authorities to provide services to citizens.

    The document gives a fascinating insight into how the laundering of drug money works. It details how investigators “found readily identifiable evidence of red flags of large-scale money laundering”. There were “structured wire transfers” whereby “it was commonplace in the CDC accounts for round-number wire transfers to be made on the same day or in close succession, by the same wire senders, for the … same account”.

    Sick at lice, second AID; I could eat it to the stalks. Hoffman, the rate you STRAIGHT TIME gin Bette Middler. Xome back any time you are in Shicago Title, on the works.

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